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INTRODUCTION

If you take the turn at the Big B Food Store and drive west out of Karnes
City, Texas, you can trace along the roadside about one hundred linear miles of
grassland. The grassland straddles a line between the wetter lands of central
Texas and the drier climate of south Texas. The wildflowers are abundant with
a mix of Virginia creeper, Mexican persimmon, and California poppies. It is
easier than one would think to get lost in the grasses. From the town of Fashing
to Charlotte, the road makes several ninety-degree turns, abrupt and as
* Founder and legal director at the Innovation Law Lab in Portland, Oregon.
** Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School and Founder of the Ninth Circuit Appellate
Program. Both authors wish to thank Jason Cade, Holly Cooper, Ingrid Eagley, Esther Hong, Stacy
Caplow, and Jennifer Lee Koh for feedback and suggestions; Kara Hartzler for her continued legal
advocacy; and Michael Anspach and Blake Nold for tremendous editorial assistance.

HONGMANNING - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

674

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 11:23 AM

[101:673

unexpected as the occasional bursts of flame from fracking wellheads hidden
in the wildflowers. At Charlotte, just west of Interstate 35, the highway
straightens and beelines to Dilley. As the highway enters Dilley, on the left a
sign proclaims “Welcome to Dilley, Texas. ‘A Slice of the Good Life.’”1
Underneath and between Dilley and Karnes City is the vast Eagle Ford
Shale Formation—a southward sloping ancient sedimentary rock that is one of
the most active oil and gas drilling sites in the United States.2 The vast
operations create a boomtown quality to Dilley and Karnes City with temporary
housing for roughneck riggers springing up in meadows, fields, and farms.
Inside Dilley and Karnes City lie the concrete and wire realization of
former-President Obama’s deportation-as-policy goals.3 The Karnes City
Residential Center and the South Texas Residential Center—whose combined
capacity to incarcerate small children and women who have been fast-tracked
for deportation—nearly matches half the permanent free population of the
towns.4
1. Anthony Kayruz, A Slice of the Good Life, THE POLITIC (Mar. 29, 2015),
http://thepolitic.org/a-slice-of-the-good-life/ [https://perma.cc/MV26-EN64]. See generally Jake
Naughton, Dilley, Tex., Home to the Nation’s Largest Immigration Detention Center, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2016/03/21/blogs/dilley-tex-home-to-thenations-largest-immigration-detention-center/s/end.html [https://perma.cc/T2TY-UKES].
2. EAGLE FORD SHALE, https://eaglefordshale.com/ [https://perma.cc/383K-TK8Z] (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018).
3. See Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More People Than Any Other President, ABC
NEWS
(Aug.
29,
2016),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportation-policynumbers/story?id=41715661 [https://perma.cc/EK5Y-LTKA] (“According to governmental data, the
Obama administration has deported more people than any other president’s administration in history.
In fact, they have deported more than the sum of all the presidents of the 20th century.” (referencing
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2016 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016%20Yearbook%20of%20Immigration%20S
tatistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETH4-BLVS] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018))). More than 80% of
individuals deported had no or no serious criminal record. See Elliot Young, The Hard Truths About
Obama’s
Deportation
Priorities,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
1,
2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hard-truths-about-obamas-deportationpriorities_us_58b3c9e7e4b0658fc20f979e [https://perma.cc/3TZ6-P4JL].
4. According to the websites of CoreCivic and Geo Corporation (which operate South Texas
Family Residential Center and Karnes County Detention Center, respectively), the combined detention
capacity is 3,558 people.
See South Texas Family Residential Center, CORECIVIC,
http://www.corecivic.com/facilities/south-texas-family-residential-center
[http://perma.cc/CHC2XU47] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); Naughton, supra note 1 (stating that South Texas Family Residential
Center’s capacity is 2,400); Karnes County Residential Center, GEO GROUP, INC.,
https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/58 [https://perma.cc/5MU6-2QA8] (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018) (representing that its capacity is 1,158). Based on the most recent census, the population
of Dilley, Texas, is 3,894, and the population of Karnes City, Texas, is 3,042. See American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml
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If capacity is a measure of power, then the family detention centers in Dilley
and Karnes City represent a significant expression of contemporary
immigration power. Measured by size, they are the largest immigrant detention
centers in the United States with a combined capacity equal to more than ten
percent of the entire immigrant detention system.5 Dilley itself holds the
distinction of being the largest immigrant detention center in the United States
with a bed-capacity of 2,400 humans.6 Dilley is a converted man-camp for oil
industry workers, that is now run for profit.7
In blunt legal force, Dilley and Karnes represent a concentrated dose of
plenary power. Under a theory of plenary power, the political branches of the
federal government exercise a nearly monarchial rule over noncitizens who
have limited avenues for judicial review and, in theory, few substantive
constitutional restraints.8 Section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA),9 one of the Obama Administration’s most powerful statutory
provisions, was deployed in facilities such as Dilley and Karnes to create a zone
of rapid removals. The statute, as we argue here, was intentionally designed
for asymmetry. It maximizes executive power, minimizes process, and

[https://perma.cc/3BF9-97MY] (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (enter Dilley city, Texas, into search field;
and then enter Karnes City, Texas, into search field).
5. Anita Sinha, Arbitrary Detention? The Immigration Detention Bed Quota, 12 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 86–88 (2016) (describing immigrant detention bed capacity); see also supra note
4 (noting that the combined capacity is 3,558 people).
6. Chico Harlan, Inside the Administration’s $1 Billion Deal to Detain Central American Asylum
Seekers, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/insidethe-administrations-1-billion-deal-to-detain-central-american-asylum-seekers/2016/08/14/e47f19605819-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html [http://perma.cc/6X6U-YUQE]; Naughton, supra note 1.
7. Harlan, supra note 6. CoreCivic, the new name for the Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA), built and operates the facility in Dilley for the Department of Homeland Security, and earns a
substantial amount of its profit from the detention of children and women. See Harlan, supra note 6
(“In 2015, the first full year in which the South Texas Family Residential Center was operating, CCA—
which operates 74 facilities—made 14 percent of its revenue from that one center while recording
record profit.”).
8. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that ‘over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission
of aliens.” (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Jean v.
Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 965 (11th Cir. 1984) (addressing executive versus congressional authority
within the plenary power doctrine); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power:
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 926 (1995) (synthesizing
background principles on plenary power doctrine); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE
L.J. 545, 550–60 (1990) (describing foundations of plenary power).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012).
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eliminates judicial intervention—with a singular goal to deport at high
velocity.10
The family detention complexes are not the only place where section
235(b)’s rapid removal regime has been deployed. In 1996, Congress created
the rapid removal regime in a manner that “provid[es] comparatively fewer
procedural safeguards—such as a trial attorney or an immigration judge.”11
Rapid removals—also named “speed deportations” by Professor Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia and “removal in the shadows of immigration court” by
Jennifer Lee Koh—include section 235(b) expedited removal, reinstatement of
removal under section 241(a)(5),12 and administrative removal under section
238(b).13 Rapid removals concentrate power asymmetrically—fact-finding and
law—into a structurally biased adjudicator whose decision is final and not
subject to appeal.14
These rapid removal procedures have been devastatingly efficient in
effectuating mass deportations. For example, in 2013, 44% of removals were
expedited removals and 39% were reinstatement of removals.15 As noted by
the late Judge Harry Pregerson in a dissenting opinion, “[t]hat means that
363,540 people—a staggering 83% of the people removed from the U.S. in
2013—were removed without a hearing, without a judge, without legal

10. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 18–22 (2014) (explaining government’s policy interest in speed); see David
A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673,
678–80 (2000).
11. Wadhia, supra note 10, at 2; accord Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of
Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2017) (discussing these procedures).
12. Reinstatement of removal applies to those who have departed and reentered without
permission after a prior removal order. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(5); see sources cited supra note 11.
13. Administrative removal applies to non-lawful permanent residents who have been convicted
of a crime that the officer deems an aggravated felony. Immigration and Nationality Act § 238(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1228; Victoria-Faustino v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 2017) (vacating officer’s
determination that the criminal conviction was an aggravated felony and the non-citizen was subjected
to the final administrative removal order, or FARO).
14. See Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum Screening Under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (1997)
(explaining that expedited removal represents “a colossal change” where a “months or years” long
process was condensed into “hours”).
15. JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 (2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CX6L-MMU2] .
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representation, and without the opportunity to apply for most forms of relief
from removal.”16
The asymmetrical aspect of rapid removals has not gone unnoticed by the
Trump Administration. Less than two weeks after his inauguration, President
Trump ordered that rapid removals be considered a central component of his
deportation policy.17 These rapid removals have been subjected to intense
criticism for their anti-rule of law tendencies because low-level officers can
make decisions without any accountability.18 There is little to no review but
indelible adverse consequences for people who are deported, with and without
error.19
This Article interrogates whether adequate access to counsel can partially
overcome the anti-rule of law tendencies of section 235(b)’s rapid removal

16. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (citing SIMANSKI, supra note 15, at 1; ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS
THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 2 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/120214expeditedremoval_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6GK-C6GB]), withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868 F.3d 852
(9th Cir. 2017), memorandum disposition in No. 14-50393, 2017 WL 3601725 (9th Cir. Aug. 22,
2017). We discuss the American Exile report’s findings in greater detail below. See infra Section
II.C.2.
17. Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Abigail Hauslohner & David
Nakamura, In Memo, Trump Administration Weighs Expanding the Expedited Deportation Powers of
DHS, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inmemo-trump-administration-weighs-expanding-the-expedited-deportation-powers-ofdhs/2017/07/14/ce5f16b4-68ba-11e7-9928-22d00a47778f_story.html [http://perma.cc/7VQ7-B8FP].
18. Ebba Gebisa, Constitutional Concerns with the Enforcement and Expansion of Expedited
Removal, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 580–83 (2007) (arguing that due process violations are
exacerbated by lack of judicial review and wide-discretion given to low-level officers); see Kari
Hong, The Costs of Trumped-Up Immigration Enforcement Measures, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 119, 124 (2017) (discussing details and costs of “President Trump’s two executive orders from
January 2017, and their implementing memoranda, [which] outline his administration’s plan to
prioritize up to eight million people for deportation, hire 15,000 agents to arrest them, build private
prisons to detain them, and deport them by depriving them of hearings”); Koh, supra note 11, at 193
(“[T]he federal government has massively expanded its use of shadow proceedings which either
entirely or effectively bypass immigration court adjudication.”); Michele R. Pistone & John J.
Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to be Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers,
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 175–93 (2006) (describing failure of federal government to adhere to
statutes and regulations governing expedited removal); Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International
Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37
STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 134–41 (2001) (arguing that expedited removal provisions violate international
human rights laws).
19. Gebisa, supra note 18, at 580–83 (arguing that due process violations are exacerbated by
lack of judicial review and wide-discretion given to low-level officers).
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regime.20 As a practical matter, there has been no immigration reform in over
20 years. Our country has been unable to provide status to Dreamers, one of
the most sympathetic populations there is. It is not unreasonable to assume that
of all the immigration reform that is needed, correcting the gross abuses that
are out of the path, view, and sight of most Americans is far down the priority
list. So, taking the rapid removal scheme as our immediate reality: Would
adequate access to counsel mitigate against erroneous removals without
undermining the statute’s goal of speed?
In Part II, this Article describes the metrics of mass rapid removal. We
focus on INA § 235(b)’s expedited removal regime in light of the Trump
Administration’s focus on its expansion. We overlay the statutory and
regulatory framework with recent and current field practice for understanding
how the regime actually operates. We identify three distinct moments where
adjudications occur and describe the asymmetrical nature of the fact-finding
and decision-making at each of these stages. Using government generated data,
we outline the troubling incidence of error in the different stages of expedited
removal.
In Part III, for the pragmatic concerns listed above, we take an agnostic
view of the rapid removal regime’s goal of velocity and argue that speed—the
critical defining criteria of rapid removals—is compatible with meaningful
access to counsel at three different stages of an expedited removal proceeding.
We describe the process that is due to noncitizens in removal proceedings
through the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge framework.21 In particular, we
address a 2017 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, where a three judge panel was faced with the
question of whether access to counsel is required in expedited removal.22 A 21 decision initially held that, pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge,23 there is no Fifth
Amendment right to counsel in expedited removal proceedings.24 In response
to a rehearing petition, the panel vacated this decision, and resolved the case on
a different issue in an unpublished disposition.25 Nonetheless, this Article

20. The statutory emphasis on speed is likely not a rational policy choice because of its anti-rule
of law tendencies. To obtain speed, accountability mechanisms must be removed.
21. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
22. See United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), withdrawn on grant of
reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), memorandum disposition in No. 14-50393, 2017 WL 3601725
(9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).
23. 424 U.S. 319.
24. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d at 1142.
25. See Peralta-Sanchez, No. 14-50393, 2017 WL 3601725.
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examines how the majority opinion missed critical considerations in reaching
the later-vacated decision.
Analyzing examples from the pro bono attorney representation projects at
the South Texas Residential Center that provide access to counsel to those in
expedited removal proceedings, Ingrid Eagley and Steven Shaffer’s 2015 study
on access to counsel, court decisions, and published investigative reports, there
is no doubt that legal representation improves the accuracy of the
determinations made in expedited removal proceedings. From surveys
conducted at two different detention centers where more than 35,000 noncitizens were provided legal representation in expedited removal proceedings,
removals for those with legal representation dropped at rates of 97% and 99%.26
Lawyers stopped removal for those who had been wrongfully subjected to
expedited removal proceedings or had a basis to request legal status. This was
done without sacrificing speed in the adjudication.27
In Part IV we conclude that providing meaningful access to counsel
throughout the expedited removal regime—at each of the critical fact-finding
and adjudication moments—improves accuracy without substantially
impacting speed. Not only does it improve accuracy, but the constitutional
requirements of due process strongly favor meaningful access to counsel in
light of the interests at stake.
II. THE METRICS OF MASS RAPID REMOVAL
The rapid removal regime works hard to remove noncitizens on a massive
scale. From 1996 to 2016, there were 5,612,142 people ordered removed from

26. Stephen Manning, Innovation Law Lab, Migration Policy Institute’s Immigration Policy
Enforcement Conference, C-SPAN, at 6:28 (Sept. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Manning, Conference],
https://www.c-span.org/video/?415068-102/immigration-policy-enforcement [https://perma.cc/59SC7BM8] (citing the 35,000 number of women and children subjected to expedited removal); id. at 8:47–
9:01 (explaining data and saying that “nearly universally” expedited removal orders were rescinded
and fewer than 0.01% of CARA represented that clients were removed during the expedited removal
process); STEPHEN W. MANNING, INNOVATION LAW LAB, THE ARTESIA REPORT ch. X,
https://innovationlawlab.org/the-artesia-report/the-artesia-report/ [https://perma.cc/5F87-B2UK] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2018) [hereinafter ARTESIA REPORT ] (stating that after attorney representation began,
“[t]he pace of removals fell 80% within one month and, within two months, it had fallen 97%”).
27. Indeed, the available empirical data indicates that attorney participation in the expedited
removal proceedings has no meaningful impact on the pace of adjudication. At the Dilley detention
center, known formally as the South Texas Family Residential Center, where counsel is available to
any person detained there, the expedited removal proceedings generally take two to four weeks. See
Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907, 910 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
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the United States, which averages to 280,607 people each year.28 By way of
contrast, before the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), in 1980 and 1990, 18,013 and 30,039 people,
respectively, were ordered deported, jumping from 69,680 to 114,432 in 1997,
and peaking in 2013 with 433,034 removals.29
From 2010 to 2016, when data is available, rapid removals accounted for
76% of all removals.30 That is a lot of humanity—extrapolating the 76% rate
across all 20 years, that means 4,238,374 people were removed without a
hearing, without a judge, and without a lawyer.
Most of those rapid removals originate with section 235(b)’s expedited
removal statute.31 Once the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) opts to
employ its prosecutorial discretion to use section 235(b)’s expedited removal
regime against a particular non-citizen, the removal process unfolds in three
key moments: (1) an initial fact-finding and adjudication of removability; (2) a
credible fear screening for benefits under law; and (3) an administrative review
of any adverse fear screening decision.32 Each stage of the proceedings are
governed by statute and regulation.33 If the words of the statute and regulations
were properly adhered to, adjudications might result in consistently correct
decision-making. Yet the asymmetrical aspect of the statute and regulations
eliminate any systemic accountability and rely on the good graces—and
presumed infallibility—of the low-level officials who carry out the program.
Persuasive analysis of what these low-level officials do in practice, however,
demonstrates troubling incidences of error at each step.
A. Adjudications in Expedited Removal
In form, section 235(b) authorizes rapid removals that bypass court
oversight and review. The physical border zone of the United States is already
28. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2016 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS tbl.39
(2017), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2016/table39 [https://perma.cc/8TZN3S42]. In 2016, the number feel to 340,056. Id.
29. Id.
30. See BRYAN BAKER, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2016, at 8 tbl.6 (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJ3N-ZTVW].
31. See id. From 2010 to 2016, 38.8% of all removals were from expedited removals and 36.7%
were from reinstatement of removal procedures. Id. The remaining 24.5% include regular removal
proceedings and final administrative removal orders, in which a single immigration officer finds that
a non-citizen has a prior conviction that is an aggravated felony. Id.
32. See infra Section II.A.1–3.
33. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 235, 8 U.S.C § 1225 (2012).
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a constitutionally dark area and, inside this obscurity, Congress built section
235(b) to distill executive immigration power by function, form, and
implementation. Its function is rapid removals—really, really rapid removals.
Its singular goal seems to be to get a final, unappealable, executable removal
order in the shortest period of time possible.34
Detention insidiously became an integral feature of the expedited removal
scheme. In response to the Central American refugee crisis, President Obama
himself sent the clear message that deportation would happen within ten to
fifteen days of a person’s arrival, a policy designed not to speed up the asylum
process but to quickly reach the predestined denial. As he explained in an
interview with George Stephanopoulos, “Do not send your children to the
borders . . . . If they do make it, they’ll get sent back. More importantly, they
may not make it.”35 The expedited process was designed then for the deported
person to be a testament to the inhospitality of the United States. To realize
then the promise of velocity, it was no accident that the Obama administration
chose to build detention centers from scratch in remote, isolated areas that were
far from cities, towns, and, most importantly, lawyers.36 The detention center
was really created to serve as a deportation center.
34. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-98-81, ILLEGAL ALIENS: CHANGES IN
THE PROCESS OF DENYING ALIENS ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES 38 tbl.2.3 (1998) (providing
completion times ranging from just under 2.5 hours up to over 7 hours).
35. Juan Carlos Llorca, Fed Says They Will Expedite Deportations to 10–15 Days at N.M.
Facility, SEATTLE TIMES (Jun. 27, 2014), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/fed-says-theywill-expedite-deportations-to-10-15-days-at-nm-facility/ [https://perma.cc/8QP4-ZG92].
36. ARTESIA REPORT, supra note 26, at ch. III (“On June 24, 2014, Artesia opened. It was
designed by the Obama Administration to deport rapidly. It was the Obama Administration’s carefully
orchestrated machine that had been efficiently built to effectuate ‘waves’ of deportations—massive
incidents of deportations occurring at a high velocity. Obama’s officials explained that the detention
center in Artesia was the tool to achieve the goal of ‘processing the immigrants and hav[ing] them
deported within 10 to 15 days to send a message back to their home countries that there are
consequences for illegal immigration.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). The expedited
removal statute authorizes the DHS to detain a noncitizen during the credible fear process. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). The detention authority changes depending on how far into the credible
fear process the noncitizen’s claim has advanced. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A noncitizen may be detained
incident to her apprehension and this period is generally limited to forty-eight hours. During this period
of apprehension, if DHS elects to use the expedited removal process against the noncitizen, she will be
ordered removed under section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). There is a dispute between advocates and the DHS about the detention authority
for noncitizens in the early stages of the credible fear process—a dispute that the courts have not
resolved. Detention may be authorized under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
because there is a final order of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), or it may be inferred under section
235(b)’s inspection regime because there is no clear statutory authorization in the statute for detention
during this period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). There is a regulation that DHS relies on to detain a credible
fear applicant. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2017). This regulation may be unlawful but, because of the
jurisdictional preclusion rules, no court has actually resolved the issue. Once an applicant is found to
have a credible fear, her detention is initially authorized under section 235(b)(1)(B)(ii). 8 U.S.C.
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As mentioned above, in an expedited removal proceeding, there are three
distinct moments where different adjudications take place based on three
different factual records. First, there is an adjudication of removability and the
entry of an expedited removal order by one agency.37 Second, a separate agency
creates a separate factual record and adjudicates whether the noncitizen has a
cognizable credible fear of persecution or torture.38 Third, an immigration
judge, in an ex parte proceeding, conducts a de novo review of any adverse
credible fear determinations.39 Each is taken up separately below.
1. Removability
The first moment for an adjudication is, actually, a nearly simultaneous act
of fact-finding and adjudication.40 At the time of apprehension, an immigration
officer makes an initial determination that a noncitizen is inadmissible to the
United States, based on whether she falls in one or more of the dozens of
grounds defined by Congress, which may range from the minor conduct of not
being in possession of the right documents for admission to the United States,
such as a visa or admission papers, or the more serious allegations that she has
engaged in fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact to gain admission.41
The immigration officer conducts an interrogation of the noncitizen using a
prescribed form, reads the form to the noncitizen, and then orders her

§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). There is a dispute between the DHS and advocates as to when this detention
authority ends and shifts to section 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (the general, discretionary detention
authority). For noncitizens who appear at a port-of-entry, the DHS asserts that this detention authority
continues until the noncitizen’s application for asylum is adjudicated. A better reading of the statute
is that the detention authority ends (as does section 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)), when removal
proceedings are commenced. Id. If an applicant is found to not have a credible fear, detention is
authorized under section 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). This section
provides for detention until after an immigration judge reviews the negative credible fear finding and,
if affirmed, until removal. See id.
37. See infra Section II.A.1.
38. See infra Section II.A.2.
39. See infra Section II.A.3.
40. See ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, at vii
(2016) [hereinafter USCIRF STUDY 2016].
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1) (defining applicability of expedited
removal procedures); Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. The general categories
include health-related grounds (subsection (a)(1)); crimes (subsection (a)(2)); security (subsection
(a)(3)); likelihood of being a public charge (subsection (a)(4)); failure to abide by certain employment
conditions (subsection (a)(5)); engagement in fraud or failure to appear at hearings (subsection(a)(6));
lack of documentation or status (subsection (a)(7)); draft evaders (subsection (a)(8)); and those
previously ordered removed (subsection (a)(9)). Id.
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removed.42 The regulations require that “[i]n every case in which the expedited
removal provisions will be applied and before removing an alien from the
United States pursuant to this section, the examining officer shall create a
record of the facts of the case and statements made by the alien.”43 The
examining officer must use a particular form, Form I-867A/B, or “Record of
Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 235(a)(1) of the Act” to record
the facts of the case.44
Outside the presence of and without hearing from the noncitizen, the
examining immigration officer presents her findings and conclusion to another
immigration officer—which is her supervisor.45 This is a markedly different
process than regular removal proceedings where an impartial factfinder is
charged with the determination to order someone removed.46 Even though there
are criticisms that regular removal proceedings also have a bias towards
removal, the factfinder is not the same person who also made the initial
determination to charge the non-citizen.47 Statistics that show some degree of
independence exists as measured by the high rates by which immigration judges
grant relief to non-citizens, rates that increase dramatically when non-citizens
are represented by counsel.48

42. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i).
43. Id.
44. Id.; USCIRF STUDY 2016, supra note 40, at 75 app. A (reproducing Form I867A/B).
45. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i); USCIRF STUDY 2016, supra note 40, at 75 app. A (reproducing
Form I867A/B).
46. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
47. Kari Hong, Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Immigration Courts, and Derivative
Citizenship, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 330–42 (2014) (discussing structural biases towards removal,
including the lack of independence from the prosecuting attorneys and political pressures, facing
immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals).
48. Before Trump took office, approximately half of the people in regular removal proceedings
were granted status. See Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Immigrants Are Winning Half of All Deportation Cases
So Far This Year, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 18, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/immigrants-arewinning-half-of-all-deportation-cases-so-far-this-year-fe5a58dbd78e/#.qapv4ggom
[https://perma.cc/9BZS-UZ5Y]. Even under Trump, for those with attorneys, the granted rate is much
higher. In 2017, in one New York City immigration court, a program found a lawyer for every detained
case: the grant rate went from 4% percent to 24%, and is predicted to be 77% when all pending cases
are counted. See Dara Lind, A New York Courtroom Gave Every Detained Immigrant A Lawyer. The
Results Were Staggering, VOX (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/11/9/16623906/immigration-court-lawyer [https://perma.cc/ZBM8-R3DS].
The
profound impact that representation has on outcomes was corroborated in a national study of 1.2
million cases showing that, for those outside of detention, grant rates went from 13% to 63% if the
non-citizen had an attorney. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to
Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53 tbl.3 (2015).
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Returning to section 235, the officer’s supervisor then reviews the
documents prepared by the examining officer, but does not hear from or directly
inquire of the noncitizen.49 Then, using a single form, Form I-860, or “Notice
and Order of Expedited Removal,” the examining immigration officer
simultaneously serves notice of the finding of removability and the removal
order itself.50 Eventually everyone is expected to read everything, it all gets
initialed, and that is it.51
2. Credible Fear Screening
The second adjudication within section 235(b)’s expedited removal regime
is triggered if and only if the noncitizen expresses a fear of return or an intent
to seek asylum.52 This is the credible fear screening.
Credible fear screening is supposed to “quickly identify potentially
meritorious claims to protection and to resolve frivolous ones with dispatch.”53
The statute tasks an “asylum officer” with the exclusive jurisdiction to make a
credible fear determination.54 The determination can only be made after an
interview.55 The regulations prescribe the form and content of the interview.56
The interview must be non-adversarial and private,57 and the purpose of the
49. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2), (b)(7). The supervisor has to review “the sworn statement and any
answers and statements made by the alien regarding a fear of removal or return.” Id. § 235.3(b)(7). If
there is a claim of lawful permanent residence status, the supervisor is authorized to ask for additional
information, in his or her discretion, and may also direct that the noncitizen be interviewed again. Id.
50. Id.
51. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROT., INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL ch. 17.15(b) (2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL ];
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 34, at 32.
52. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)
(describing referral process); 8 C.F.R § 235.3(b)(4) (“If an alien subject to the expedited removal
provisions indicates an intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of persecution or torture, or a
fear of return to his or her country, the inspecting officer shall not proceed further with the removal of
the alien until the alien has been referred for an interview by an asylum officer in accordance with 8
C.F.R. 208.30.”); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (providing different steps of credible fear screening). See
generally Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E) (defining “asylum
officer”).
53. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8479 (Feb. 19,
1999) (interim rule).
54. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012)
(delegating role exclusively to asylum officer); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E) (defining “asylum officer”);
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(a).
55. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that “[a]n asylum officer shall conduct interviews of
aliens referred” for a credible screening); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d).
56. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d).
57. Id.
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interview is to elicit all relevant and useful information regarding a credible
fear of persecution.58
The credible fear standard is a threshold screening device, or at least it was
statutorily intended to be.59 A noncitizen satisfies the credible fear standard if
she proves a “significant possibility” that she could prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that she is eligible for asylum.60 “Essentially, the asylum officer
is applying a threshold screening standard to decide whether an asylum claim
holds enough promise that it should be heard through the regular, full process
or whether, instead, the person’s removal should be effected through the
expedited process.”61
What “significant possibility of persecution” means has never been tested
in the courts and, in practice, is saddled with an elusive (and likely unlawful)
agency interpretation.62 The elusive nature of the government’s interpretation
58. Id.
59. SARA CAMPOS & JOAN FRIEDLAND, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, MEXICAN AND
CENTRAL AMERICAN ASYLUM AND CREDIBLE FEAR CLAIMS: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT, 3–4
(May 2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/mexican-and-central-americanasylum-and-credible-fear-claims-background-and-context
[https://perma.cc/EV7Y-YYL5]
(describing persuasive evidence of government manipulation of the credible fear process for political
reasons).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (defining “credible fear of persecution” to mean “that there is a
significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support
of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish
eligibility for asylum under section 208”). To demonstrate eligibility for asylum, an applicant has the
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she satisfies the refugee definition.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).
61. Cooper, supra note 14, at 1503.
62. For purposes of this Article, we rely on the government’s asylum office’s interpretation of
the statute without rendering any analysis as to the correctness of the government’s interpretation. The
government’s interpretation of “credible fear” has been deeply criticized as being ideologically
motivated and in derogation of the statutory standard. The government’s interpretation changed in an
arguably dramatic fashion in 2014 when many Central Americans arrived at the U.S. border to apply
for asylum. See CAMPOS & FRIEDLAND, supra note 59, at 4 (“[A] fair reading of the Lesson Plan
leaves one with the clearly improper message that asylum officers must apply a standard that far
surpasses what is intended by the statutory framework and U.S. asylum law.” (quoting noted scholar
Bill Ong Hing)); DREE K. COLLOPY, CRISIS AT THE BORDER, PART II: DEMONSTRATING CREDIBLE
FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE (2016), Westlaw 16-04 Immigration Briefings (“Legal scholars
and advocates criticized these 2014 changes as unlawfully heightening the standard of proof for
demonstrating a credible fear of persecution and torture.”) [hereinafter COLLOPY, CRISIS AT THE
BORDER]; Angela Edman & Dree Collopy, Credible Fear Lesson Plans Comparison Chart: 2006 to
2014 to 2017, AILA Doc. No. 17032901 (Mar. 29, 2017). There is a better interpretation of the
statutory credible fear standard that would require that an applicant demonstrate a fear that is
subjectively reasonable and not objectively unfounded. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R
FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), A THEMATIC COMPILATION OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
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of “credible fear” is apparent in its training materials where it describes,
variously, the standard as “a substantial and realistic possibility of succeeding,”
as “not requiring the applicant to show that he or she is more likely than not
going to succeed when before an immigration judge,” and a claim must have
more than a minimal or mere possibility of success.63 An applicant “must
produce sufficiently convincing evidence that establishes the facts of the case,
and that those facts must meet the relevant legal standard.”64 These different
formulations of the standard are further tugged in different directions by other
important considerations in applying the agency’s interpretation of “significant
possibility.”65
The asylum officer is supposed to create a factual record that is used for the
credible fear determination.66 The record must be written, include a summary
of the material facts, and should be based on the noncitizen’s testimony and
“such other facts as are known to the officer.”67 This record is memorialized,
in the normal course, on either government form I-870, “Record of
Determination/Credible Fear Worksheet” (for positive findings), or form I-869,
“Record of Negative Credible Fear Finding and Request for Review by
Immigration Judge.”68 According to the standard operating procedures for
credible fear screening at one of the family detention centers, the record of
proceeding may include other documents, but not necessarily “routine” country
conditions information.69
Obviously, as a practical matter, to reach this stage requires that an
expression of fear or intention for asylum is recorded properly because in the

438–39 (7th ed. 2014) (threshold asylum screenings should be adjudged by a “manifestly unfounded”
or “abusive character” standard).
63. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV.’S–RAIO, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER
TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 14–15 (2014) [hereinafter USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR TRAINING
2014].
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 15–16.
66. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II)
(2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1) (2017).
67. U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II), (v); accord 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1) (“The asylum officer
shall create a written record of his or her determination, including a summary of the material facts as
stated by the applicant, any additional facts relied on by the officer, and the officer’s determination of
whether, in light of such facts, the alien has established a credible fear of persecution or torture.”).
68. USCIS, CREDIBLE FEAR TRAINING 2014, supra note 63, at 1–2.
69. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV.’S, CREDIBLE FEAR PROCESSING GUIDE 3–4,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/About%20Us/Electronic%20Reading%20Room/Poli
cies_and_Manuals/Credible_Fear_Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LPA-9VNR] (last visited Mar. 8,
2018) [hereinafter USCIS, CREDIBLE FEAR GUIDE ].
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supervisory review process there is no means to compare what was actually said
during the examining officer’s interrogation of the noncitizen with what the
examining officer recorded in the record of proceedings.70
3. Credible Fear Review
The third adjudication is triggered if the noncitizen fails the second
adjudication. An immigration judge may review, at the noncitizen’s request, a
negative credible fear determination.71 The immigration judge receives a
record of proceeding from the asylum office that must consist of the written
record of the negative fear determination, the summary of material facts, and
other materials on which the negative credible fear determination was based.72
This fear review can take place by telephone without the noncitizen’s consent.73
The immigration judge creates a new record of proceeding for the fear review74
which can consist of “any oral or written statement which is material and
relevant to any issue in the review.”75
Through its implementation, section 235(b) “give[s] officers a great deal of
authority over removal of aliens[.]”76 This “great deal of authority” has no
accountability check other than strict adherence to the formal rules of the
process because Congress has precluded judicial review over individualized
expedited removal orders and created barriers to systemic challenges to its
implementation that have never been overcome in its twenty-plus years
existence.77
B. Attorneys & Expedited Removal Proceedings
While this Article is about the constitutional right of access to counsel
during expedited removal proceedings, there is strong statutory basis for a right

70. As we explain later, there are numerous documented incidences of error when the records of
proceeding are created. See infra Section II.C.
71. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(i) (2017). While the statute and regulations place the burden on
the noncitizen to request a fear review, the government’s practice to date has been to presume the
noncitizen wants review and requires the noncitizen to opt out of the review process. See USCIS,
CREDIBLE FEAR GUIDE, supra note 69, at 47–48.
72. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g)(2)(ii), 1208.30(g)(2)(ii), 1003.42(a).
73. Id. § 1003.25(c).
74. Id. § 1003.42(b).
75. Id. § 1003.42(c).
76. INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 51, at ch. 17.15(b).
77. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(A)(iii), (e), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii), (e)
(2012); see Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 429–33 (3d Cir. 2016) (collecting
cases).
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of access to counsel78—statutes and regulations which the government has
never seriously addressed. Though the legislative history is sparse on the point,
when the expedited removal statute was enacted, a statutory grant of authority
was provided for noncitizens to access non-attorneys during, at least, the
credible fear proceedings.79 This made sense in a very practical way: attorney
representation at the place of the expedited proceedings was, in 1996, largely
non-existent. When expedited removal was first implemented it was confined
mostly to the airports and ports of entry80—and attorneys were not then
regularly appearing to represent individuals at the airports. It is easy to imagine
though that clergy, religious organizations, friends, and family were often at
airports and ports of entry to greet newcomers and family. Yet the rules
regarding representation at immigration proceedings would not have permitted
any of these individuals to assist a noncitizen trapped in expedited removal in
any functional basis.81 To accommodate them, the statute included a provision
providing for the right to consult prior to a credible fear interview.82 The
government has interpreted this provision as displacing a right of access to
attorney representation during all stages of the expedited removal proceeding.83
78. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv).
80. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of
Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10311, 10319–20 (Mar. 6, 1997) [hereinafter
Expedited Removal Final Rule] (expressing government intent to hold most credible fear interviews at
detention centers while leaving open the possibility of airports and ports of entry). A lot has changed
since then. See, e.g., Margaret Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes . . . Crowding in Upon Us”: The
Executive Branch’s Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 185, 199 (2015) (“What changed the outcomes at Artesia was a massive mobilization of pro bono
attorneys to challenge the machinery of deportation erected there. Volunteers at Artesia worked in
teams to represent detained mothers and children—seeking new credible fear interviews to prevent
imminent removals, petitioning for release of families on bond, and representing applicants at merits
hearings.”); Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s Order, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawyers-trump-muslim-banimmigration.html [https://perma.cc/R2AL-CHFJ]; Lucy Westcott, Thousands of Lawyers Descend on
U.S. Airports to Fight Trump’s Immigrant Ban, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 29, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/lawyers-volunteer-us-airports-trump-ban-549830
[https://perma.cc/79KZ-VKU4].
81. See 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 (2017).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv) (“An alien who is eligible for [a credible fear interview] may
consult with a person or persons of the alien’s choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof,
according to regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Such a consultation shall be at no expense
to the Government and shall not unreasonably delay the process.”).
83. Expedited Removal Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 10320 (taking the view that a noncitizen is not
entitled to formal counsel or representation during the credible fear interview); COLLOPY, CRISIS AT
THE BORDER, supra note 62, at 9 & nn.101–06; U.S. CITIZENSHIP IMMIGR. SERV.’S, RAIO ASYLUM

HONGMANNING - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

GETTING IT RIGHTED

5/4/18 11:23 AM

689

It seems that in the government’s view the right to access an attorney was
merged into the consultant provision.84 That, however, does not make sense,
because at the time of the expedited removal statute’s enactment, all noncitizens
who had to appear for interrogation before an immigration officer were already
entitled to be accompanied, represented, and counseled by an attorney of his or
her choice.85 The government’s choice to merge the separate roles of an
attorney who is a trained legal professional with clergy, friend, or family
member is strikingly odd.
C. Accuracy and Incidence of Error
There is substantial evidence that the incidence of error during expedited
removal adjudications is pervasive. Two important congressionally authorized
studies,86 a follow-up U.S. government commission report,87 and an exhaustive
privately-funded report based on government data and field interviews88
demonstrates that there are errors abound in the expedited removal process—
errors that have plagued the program since its inception.
1. The USCIRF Studies
In 1998, two years after the enactment of the expedited removal statute,
Congress commissioned a panel of experts through the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) to conduct a study
of the expedited removal program.89 Congress directed four questions to the
commission with regard to how the expedited removal program was actually
implemented by the responsible agencies: (1) Was the agency improperly
encouraging asylum-seekers to withdraw their applications for admission? (2)
Was the agency incorrectly failing to refer asylum-seekers for an interview by
an asylum officer for a determination of whether they have a credible fear of
persecution? (3) Was the agency incorrectly removing asylum-seekers to
countries where they may be persecuted? (4) Was the agency improperly
detaining asylum-seekers or detaining them in inappropriate conditions?90

DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 45–46 (2017) [hereinafter USCIS CREDIBLE
FEAR TRAINING 2017].
84. See USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR TRAINING 2017, supra note 83, at 46.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012).
86. See infra Section II.C.1.
87. See infra Section II.C.1.
88. See infra Section II.C.2.
89. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 § 605(a), 22 U.S.C § 6474 (2012).
90. U.S.C. § 6474(a)(2).
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Since then, the USCIRF has conducted three studies—in 2005, 2007, and
2016.91 In each study, the USCIRF had unprecedented access to the actual
operations of the expedited removal program. The 2005 study observed and
collected data from 404 secondary inspections; interviewed 194 noncitizens in
expedited removal proceedings; and reviewed a random sample of an additional
339 records from ports of entry, 32 records of noncitizens who dissolved their
claims, 163 records from the Board of Immigration Appeals, and 321 records
for noncitizens referred for a credible fear screening.92 The study surveyed,
among other data, all eight asylum offices and nineteen detention facilities and
interviewed additional asylum-seekers.93 For their 2007 report, the USCIRF
addressed the impact of their findings and recommendations from 2005 on the
expedited removal program.94 The commission reviewed each major finding
and recommendation by responsible agency.95 For their 2016 study, the
USCIRF conducted field studies between 2012 and 2014 at five ports of entry,
four border patrol stations, five asylum offices, and fifteen immigrant detention
facilities.96 They interviewed DHS officials, facility personnel, and noncitizens
at all stages of the process.97 Their study included observation and analysis of
virtual processing—the use of technology interfaces, including video and audio
systems, to conduct expedited removal proceedings without in-person
contact.98
The USCIRF studies and report persuasively describe how the
concentration of so much executive power into a single statute without any
accountability mechanism therein has created a rapid removal anti-rule of law
regime in the field. The rule of law exists in the expedited removal regime only
if each officer in the regime faithfully follows the written words of the statute
and regulations because Congress eliminated all checks on the individual
exercise of executive power for rapid removals.99
91. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 1 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS (2005) [hereinafter USCIRF STUDY 2005];
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT (2007) [hereinafter USCIRF REPORT
2007]; USCIRF STUDY 2016, supra note 40.
92. USCIRF STUDY 2005, supra note 91, at 3–4.
93. Id. at 4.
94. USCIRF REPORT 2007, supra note 91, at 4.
95. See id.
96. USCIRF STUDY 2016, supra note 40, at 9.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 9, 20, 24.
99. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(A)(iii), (e), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii),
(e) (2012); see also Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 429–33 (3d Cir. 2016)
(collecting cases).
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The findings from the USCIRF are breathtaking. The 2005 study found
that in 86.5% of the cases, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) recorded
false information about responses to the I-867A/B fear questions.100 In seventytwo percent of the cases, CBP denied noncitizens the opportunity to review or
respond before requiring the noncitizen’s signature on the forms.101 The
commission found that the I-867A/B often contained falsely recorded
information indicating information was provided when it was not, and recorded
answers to questions that were never asked.102 15% of the time, a noncitizen
who expressed fear (and therefore should have been referred), was falsely
recorded as having not, and was removed.103 Our editorial emphasis on
“breathtaking” stems from the pervasiveness of the incidence of error and the
failure of the regime’s “checks” to actually provide an accountability function:
in spite of the pervasive falsification of information, all of the documents
required verifications and oaths by multiple sworn officers. Unsurprisingly, the
2007 report awarded a grade of F to CBP because DHS would not confirm that
any of the commission’s recommendations to address these errors were
undertaken and there was no publicly available information indicating that any
of the recommendations had been implemented.104
The 2016 report found that CBP failed to read back answers to the
interviewee and failed to allow the interviewee to correct errors in the forms
before requiring a signature.105 Direct observers found that CBP entered false
responses into the fear questions and used standardized questions and answers
to populate the required responses by copying and pasting from pre-prepared
text.106 Moreover, data from different interviews with different noncitizens was
intermingled.107
2. The American Exile Report
In an exhaustive, detailed report based on government-derived data and
field interviews with individuals who had been subjected to deportation under
a rapid removal regime, the ACLU Foundation found that the “statutory
100. ALLEN KELLER ET AL., STUDY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL:
EVALUATION OF FEAR REFERRAL IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL AT PORTS OF ENTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES 15 (2005) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF FEAR REFERRAL].
101. USCIRF STUDY 2016, supra note 40, at 19.
102. EVALUATION OF FEAR REFERRAL, supra note 100, at 15.
103. Id. at 20 tbl.3.1.
104. USCIRF REPORT 2007, supra note 91, at 58–59.
105. USCIRF STUDY 2016, supra note 40, at 20.
106. Id. at 24–25.
107. See id. at 25.
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safeguards [of the expedited removal program] have proven illusory for many
bona fide asylum seekers.”108 Reviewing data collected from interviews with
89 individuals who had been subjected to one of the rapid removal regimes, the
study found that 49 people (55% of those surveyed) were never asked about
their fear of persecution or that they were not asked anything in a language they
could understand.109 Only 25 were asked if they were afraid, and of that group
10 people (40%) indicated that immigration officers had disregarded the fear
screening protocol entirely by deporting them without a fear screening even
though they had reported having a fear.110 The study describes instances where
CBP misrepresented responses to the fear questions by marking no fear, when
the noncitizen claimed a fear of harm.111 The study found that at least 5
individuals who were U.S. citizens were deported erroneously through rapid
removals.112 The study described 2 U.S. citizens who were illegally subjected
to expedited removal because their mental impairments prevented them from
providing accurate information about their status.113
Rapid removals have been and continue to be justified because they
presumably only apply to those who have no ties and no reason to be in this
country. For instance, in its later withdrawn opinion, the Peralta-Sanchez
decision explained that the adverse impact that removal has on non-citizens
arises because people who developed extensive ties and roots face the potential
loss of “formal legal status here, and certainly the life he or she has created
here.”114 By contrast, those facing rapid removals have no potential loss
because they “had been present in the United States for some period of time
[not] longer than a few minutes or hours.”115
The documented errors, which are systematically designed to not be
corrected, prove this justification to be legal fiction, and a dangerous one at that.
Rapid removals are being used to deny protection to those with valid asylum
claims, and, with its asymmetrical execution, sweep in (or rather sweep out)
those who never should have been subjected to the truncated procedure because
they are long-term residents, asylum seekers, and even lawful permanent
residents and citizens.
108. ACLU, supra note 16, at 4.
109. Id. at 32–33.
110. Id. at 33.
111. Id. at 37–38.
112. Id. at 47–48.
113. Id. at 49.
114. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2017), withdrawn on
grant of reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), memorandum disposition in No. 14-50393, 2017 WL
3601725 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).
115. Id.
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In an ideal world, simply exposing the errors and procedural defects would
lead to the end of rapid removals. But, assuming that will not occur, Part III
calls for the significant and pragmatic intervention of establishing the right of
access to counsel in these procedures.
III. SPEED AND ACCESS TO COUNSEL
Dispensing justice in a speedy manner can become a constitutionally risky
endeavor when wrong decisions—wrong because the adjudicator got the law
wrong or wrong because the interviewer misunderstood the facts—can put a
human’s life at peril. There is a lot at stake in every rapid removal order—often
life and death—and the greater the stake, normally, the greater the procedural
protections. Yet, the workhorse of the rapid removal regime, the expedited
removal program, is designed around the singular purpose of speed. This
emphasis on velocity becomes constitutionally risky in high stakes moments
because the Fifth Amendment generally requires enough process to mitigate
against persistent systemic introductions of error.116 That is what the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision Mathews v. Eldridge117 teaches us. Speed, the
Supreme Court explains in Mathews, is just one of three factors in designing
constitutionally adequate adjudications.118
In this section, we take an agnostic view of the rapid removal regime’s goal
of velocity and argue that speed—the critical defining criteria of rapid
removals—is compatible with meaningful access to counsel at each of the three
moments of adjudication in expedited removal proceedings. We describe the
right of access to counsel, which is related to and distinct from the right to
counsel. We analyze the right of access to counsel through the lens of the three
Mathews factors. In light of the well-documented incidences of error, the
nature of the interest at stake, and the insubstantial impact on speed, we
conclude that adequate access to counsel is constitutionally required during
expedited removal proceedings.
A. The Right of Access to Counsel in Expedited Removal Proceedings
The right to counsel and the right of access to counsel are unquestionably
related and certainly distinct.119 For civil litigants, a right to a governmentprovided attorney is rooted in the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. There
116. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
117. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.
118. See id. at 335.
119. Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal
Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 113, 131–32 (2008).
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are also many compelling and persuasive reasons why a noncitizen has a Fifth
Amendment right to appointed counsel in removal proceedings under the
Mathews test.120 We use “right of access to counsel” to mean that the federal
government must allow a noncitizen to be accompanied, represented, and
advised by counsel of her choice at her expense.121 So, although related, the
right of access to counsel is distinct from a right to counsel.122
This definition describes the core aspects of what it means to have a lawyer.
The functional aspect of the definition comes as much from the obvious things
that lawyers do as well as from what Congress thinks lawyers ought to be able
to do when they are engaged in process.123 To accompany, represent, and
advise—to do those things that lawyers do—implies access to the moments that
matter. No one needs a lawyer who cannot get into the room when the big
decisions are made.
In this Article, the authors have chosen to assign the cost of representation
to the person who is seeking to exercise the right to access. We do this for four
reasons. First, we intentionally intend to distinguish the costs of providing
access from the cost of providing a lawyer. Second, our definition describes
the status quo of representation in the immigration space. Third, our data
derives from non-appointed representation. Finally, access to counsel (as
opposed to a right to appointed counsel) was the issue that recently tripped up
the Ninth Circuit.
The possibility of intervention is neither theoretical nor remote. As set forth
above in Stephen Manning’s work, attorneys are using technology and
creativity to provide volunteer legal representation in remote detention
centers.124 Further, a growing number of states and cities are paying for a corps
of attorneys to provide representation to non-citizens in detention centers.125 In
light of the reality that attorneys are organizing, and states and cities are

120. See id. at 134–35 (“Although there is no per se right to appointed counsel in removal
hearings, the Supreme Court has recognized a right to appointed counsel in other civil contexts.”). See
generally Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
121. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012).
122. Kaufman, supra note 119, at 131.
123. See id. (“A person compelled to appear in person before an agency or representative thereof
is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by
other qualified representative.”).
124. See ARTESIA REPORT, supra note 26, at ch. XIV; USCIRF STUDY 2016, supra note 40, at
54.
125. Bruce J. Einhorn, L.A. Needs To Provide Attorneys To Immigrants Facing Deportation,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-einhorn-immigrationlawyers-deportation-ice-20170327-story.html [https://perma.cc/M7DW-6HXM].
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providing funding, the right to access to counsel is reaching a growing number
of people.126
B. The Mathews Test
For over 100 years, Congress gave—and the Supreme Court endorsed—the
general scheme whereby every non-citizen received a hearing before being
deported.127 This was true for green card holders, those seeking asylum, and
also those without lawful status.128 When extending the right to release noncitizens from the confines of immigration detention, the Supreme Court
unequivocally noted that the constitution protected even those at the very
precipices of our borders, those without status.129 What is left open, however,
is what is the level of protection that is due.

126. See Lind, supra note 48 (reporting on how 12 cities and counties are exploring programs
that fund immigration attorneys for those who are detained); see also Phillipe Djegal, Undocumented
Immigrants Detained in ICE Raids to Get Legal Funding From San Francisco, KRON4 (Mar. 1, 2018),
http://kron4.com/2018/03/01/undocumented-immigrants-detained-in-ice-raids-to-get-legal-fundingfrom-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/TF26-FGSA] (reporting on San Francisco’s provision of $11
million to defend detained non-citizens in immigration proceedings). Access to counsel in immigration
proceedings is different from the right to counsel that is found in criminal proceedings. Under the
Fifth Amendment, those who are accused of a crime receive the right to counsel, which includes being
advised that the person has the right to hire an attorney, and if the person is indigent, that the State will
pay for a lawyer (usually a public defender) to represent them. Access to counsel, by contrast, is in
some parts both equal and some parts lesser to this protection available to criminal defendants. As
more and more courts are realizing in the bail and bond contexts, not having the financial means to
secure a right, in practical ways, is a denial of that right. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990–
91 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Is consideration of the detainees’ financial circumstances, as well as of possible
alternative release conditions, necessary to ensure that the conditions of their release will be reasonably
related to the governmental interest in ensuring their appearance at future hearings? We conclude that
the answer is yes.”). In this respect, for many non-citizens, especially those newly-arriving to the
country without independent financial means, the right to pay for an immigration attorney is as
meaningful as the right to buy a multi-million dollar sports franchise is for the vast majority of us. But,
unlike bond and bail proceedings, where a specific monetary amount is required to secure release, the
right of access to counsel for those in rapid removal procedures also then includes the ability for
volunteer attorneys to intervene and assist those in these rapid removal proceedings.
127. “[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here
is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations
omitted).
128. See id.
129. Id. at 693–94 (citing inter alia Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886));
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[A]liens who have once passed
through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 238 (1896) (affording due process to those ordered deported).

HONGMANNING - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

696

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 11:23 AM

[101:673

In 1996, Congress, mimicking the Tough on Crime initiatives, transformed
immigration law, ending paths to legalization and curbing (as well as outright
ending) numerous procedural protections that had been afforded noncitizens.130 Federal courts could no longer review (and correct) abuses of
discretion and factual mistakes, and a non-citizen was limited to filing only one
motion within ninety days of a final order of removal to correct mistakes or
introduce new circumstances that qualified someone for relief. 131 The rapid
removal procedures were introduced to dramatically increase the numbers of
those now deportable.
Recently, in United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, a federal court addressed the
question of whether a noncitizen has a right to access counsel during an
expedited removal proceeding.132 In Peralta-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit first
considered in a published decision whether access to an attorney is a right that
is due to a noncitizen who was subjected to expedited removal.133 In a 2-1
decision, the panel held no access to counsel was constitutionally required.134
Upon reconsideration, the panel vacated its prior decision and resolved the case
on other grounds.135 This then left open whether, in these rapid removal
procedures, the constitution requires the right to access to counsel or not.
There are probably several factors that influenced why it took two decades
for the issue to reach the U.S. Court of Appeals. Congress built the rapid
removal regime asymmetrically with an intention to bar judicial review of
individual decisions as well as severely constrain litigation aimed at systemic
challenges.136 The government’s use of expedited removal, originally more

130. Hong, supra note 18, at 122–23 (“[F]or the past 20 years, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) fundamentally altered immigration law by dramatically
expanding who could be deported and cutting off numerous ways people used to earn status.”).
131. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2012) (limiting
judicial review to legal and constitutional issues); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2017) (limiting time, number,
and basis to reopen proceedings).
132. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), withdrawn on grant of
reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), memorandum disposition in No. 14-50393, 2017 WL 3601725
(9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).
133. Id. at 1132–34.
134. Id. at 1142.
135. Peralta-Sanchez, No. 14-50393, 2017 WL 3601725 (holding that Peralta-Sanchez failed to
demonstrate prejudice).
136. See generally Cooper, supra note 14, at 1523 (“No prospect exists . . . for a body of
jurisprudence on the credible fear standard. Its application will likely depend upon training and
supervisory review of individual asylum officers, and the review principles observed by immigration
judges.”).
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circumspect, has expanded rapidly and pervasively.137
Notably, the
government’s use of the expedited removal statute against a class of noncitizens
who are, by all descriptions, bona-fide asylum seekers, has aggravated the
stakes.138 For all these reasons and others (such as that those who had been
wrongfully deported were outside of the country), the courts have not addressed
the access to counsel question.
The seminal case that determines what procedural rights are due to those
facing State deprivation of liberty or property is Mathews v. Eldridge.139 In
Mathews, the Supreme Court devised a three-part test, which considers: (1) the
private interest that will be impacted by the official action, (2) the risk of error
under existing procedures and the probable value of additional procedural
safeguards, and (3) the Government interest in existing procedures, including
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the proposed procedural safeguards
would impose.140
1. Private Interest in Accurate Adjudications
In Peralta-Sanchez, the majority decision initially concluded that those
subjected to expedited removal proceedings have interests “much more limited
than that of an alien already living here who has been placed in formal removal
proceedings and stands to lose, perhaps, formal legal status here, and certainly
the life he or she has created here.”141 The majority opinion then describes how
the existing administrative procedures work in that they are designed to quickly
remove individuals who have no right to be in the United States and who are
apprehended in the manner Mr. Peralta-Sanchez supposedly was, by the border
patrol officer following a trail of “fresh footprints” from the border to the point
of apprehension.142
This understanding of rapid removals is a distortion of who it can include
and what in fact is the actual stake those subject to these procedures face.
Expedited removal proceedings are not limited in their physical reach only to
those who have been in the country for fewer than fourteen days and for whom
no remedies are available. When first created in 1996, expedited removal was

137. See Hong, supra note 18, at 134–35.
138. See id. at 138.
139. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
140. Id. at 335.
141. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2017), withdrawn on grant
of reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), memorandum disposition in No. 14-50393, 2017 WL 3601725
(9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).
142. Id. at 1128–30.
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used by border patrol officers only at the actual ports of entry.143 In 2004, the
government expanded the geographic and temporal reach of expedited removal
to individuals apprehended within 100 air miles of the U.S. land border who are
unable to prove presence in the U.S. for more than fourteen days.144 This
sounds like a small reach, but in reality, this expansion has now brought nearly
200 million people potentially within ambit of the expedited removal.145 While
the expansion is limited in temporal scope, the federal government has
consistently argued in litigation, and some courts have found, that there is no
judicial review of expedited removal orders, including whether a person should
be subject to expedited removal at all.146
Therefore, denying a right of access to counsel to the large portion of the
population of the United States—citizen and non-citizen alike—who could
potentially be ensnared in the expedited removal program is based on the
mistaken notion that expedited removal is narrow in scope. Indeed, the Trump
administration has indicated an intent to expand the expedited removal statute
even more to possibly include the entire geography of the United States to any
individual who cannot prove, to the satisfaction of immigration agents, physical
presence for more than two years.147
The interests at stake in expedited removal proceedings are high and the
fourteen-day temporal marker is not a barometer of the stake. Asylum seekers
who are fleeing persecution have a stake to receive protections from this
country if they are eligible. Long-term residents who are potentially eligible
for cancellation of removal and have departed to attend to funerals or care for
elderly family members, have a stake in being properly identified as eligible to

143. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012)
(authorizing expedited removal against “aliens arriving” at ports of entry).
144. See Designated Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,877 (Aug. 11,
2004); Koh, supra note 11, at 197.
145. See Todd Miller, 66 Percent of Americans Now Live in a Constitution-Free Zone, THE
NATION (July 15, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/66-percent-americans-now-liveconstitution-free-zone/ [https://perma.cc/BLA9-YZ8N] (describing a population of 197.4 million
people—or 66% of the country’s population—living within the 100-mile zone of the 2004 expansion
notice).
146. See, e.g., M.S.P.C. v. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1164–65
(D.N.M. 2014).
147. See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan,
et al., Acting Comm’r, Customs & Border Protection 5–6 (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-ImmigrationLaws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP8G-VF2S] (considering expansion of
expedited removal); Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8796 (Jan. 25, 2017) (directing
consideration of expansion of expedited removal).
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apply for protections to which they are entitled. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit
considered a claim by a father and a son who were not legally eligible for
suspension of removal.148 In 1993, after having lived in the United States for
many years, they visited family in Mexico (without visas) and eventually
returned to the United States.149 The father and son were rendered ineligible to
apply for relief after a short trip “was unexpectedly extended because both of
his parents were injured during his visit and [the father] stayed to help care for
them.”150 Although the panel upheld the legal reason for disqualifying the
father and son relief, the panel—convinced by their equities—sua sponte
requested that the agency exercise discretion to permit them to remain in the
United States.151
2. Significant Errors Occur that Attorneys Would Prevent
Adequate access to counsel can substantially reduce the incidence of error
by eliminating the anti-rule of law tendencies in the expedited removal regime
without meaningfully impacting the pace of adjudication. If individuals are
allowed access to counsel at each of the moments of fact-finding and
adjudication, there is a persuasive argument that the statutory and regulatory
safeguards will be followed which are intended to produce accurate results.
There is evidence to establish that legal representation for those in expedited
removal processes makes an overwhelming difference.152 In two surveys,
conducted by pro bono attorneys who provided representation at two separate
detention centers, removal rates dropped 97% and 99% compared to those who
were processed without legal representation.153
For example, a collaborative project called the CARA Pro Bono Family
Detention Project operates at the South Texas Family Residential Center in
Dilley, Texas, to provide representation to any non-citizen detained at the
center.154 Nearly every non-citizen is in expedited removal proceedings.
According to project data of the more than 35,000 noncitizens the project has

148. Mendiola-Sanchez v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2004).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 942.
152. See ARTESIA REPORT, supra note 26, at ch. X (stating that after attorney representation
began, the “pace of removals fell 80% within one month and, within two months, it had fallen 97%”).
153. Id.; see Manning, Conference, supra note 26, at 8:47–9:01 (reporting 99% rate drop).
154. See CARA Family Detention Project, AM. IMMIGR. LAW.’S ASS’N (June 13, 2017),
http://www.aila.org/practice/pro-bono/find-your-opportunity/cara-family-detention-pro-bono-project
[https://perma.cc/5A8W-N3YX] [hereinafter CARA FAMILY PROJECT].
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represented, nearly every expedited removal order—a rate of 99%—was
vacated.155
Attorney representation for noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings
at a similar detention center (located in Artesia, New Mexico) resulted in a 97%
drop in the rate of removals over the course of just a few months.156 Indeed,
there is no data that supports a contrary assumption that adequate access to
counsel causes delays. Furthermore, the available empirical data indicates that
attorney participation in the expedited removal proceedings has no meaningful
impact on the pace of adjudication.157 For instance, at Dilley’s detention center,
where counsel is available to any person detained there, the expedited removal
proceedings generally take two to four weeks.158
There is also evidence that the outcomes in immigration court are
significantly determined by whether a person is or is not represented by quality
counsel. A comprehensive, nationwide study published in 2015 establishes that
non-citizens who are represented in immigration proceedings have a
significantly different outcome from those without representation.159 This
study, which analyzed data from 1.2 million removal cases decided between
2007 and 2012 found that represented immigrants were “almost seven times
more likely . . . to be released from the detention center (48% versus 7%).”160
In addition, detained immigrants were nearly eleven times more likely to seek
relief such as asylum than those without representation (32% with counsel
versus 3% without).161 Detained immigrants who sought relief with counsel
were also more likely to prevail: 49% won their relief application with
representation as opposed to only 23% without.162
155. See Manning, Conference, supra note 26, at 8:47–9:01 (explaining that “nearly all”
expedited removal orders were vacated and fewer than 0.01% of CARA represented clients were
removed during the expedited removal process). For information about the collaborative project, see
CARA FAMILY PROJECT, supra note 154.
156. See ARTESIA REPORT, supra note 26, at ch. X, (stating that after attorney representation
began, the “pace of removals fell 80% within one month and, within two months, it had fallen 97%”).
See generally Cindy Carcamo, Child’s Detention Despite Citizenship Reveals Immigration Case Woes,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-na-citizen-detained20140815-story.html [https://perma.cc/KE96-VQMZ] (describing case of 11-year old U.S. citizen who
was erroneously detained for a month while being subjected to expedited removal before he found an
attorney to intervene).
157. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 48, at 65 tbl.6.
158. See Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907, 910 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
159. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 48, at 2.
160. Id. at 2, 70.
161. Id. at 51 fig.15.
162. Id.
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These astonishing results should be of no surprise because immigration law
is repeatedly described by federal judges as one of the most complex and
complicated fields of law.163 The consequences facing those in deportation
proceedings are dire: “For defendants in deportation proceedings, the stakes can
be life or death, since some face torture or worse upon returning to their home
countries.”164 Even for those who do not face persecution, a removal order may
result in “permanent separation from their families.”165 A resulting system that
places such high stakes on complicated doctrines without the right to counsel
results in removal cases being akin to “death penalty cases heard in traffic court
settings.”166
3. The Government’s Efficiency Costs of Time & Money
On Mathews’ last factor, the presence of attorneys in rapid removals has
negligible impacts on time and money. The addition of an attorney to assist a
non-citizen does not require the Government to hire any more attorneys or alter
the screening procedure into a contested hearing. For all adjudications that
currently occur before the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services—
including affirmative asylum applications, family petitions, adjustment
applications, naturalization applications, and waivers—the Government does
not provide a single attorney to contest the determination made by the
immigration officer tasked with the adjudication.167 In these proceedings, noncitizens have the right to hire an attorney.168 There then is an existing model
whereby adjudications can occur without contested proceedings. This is
particularly true given that, unlike the USCIS, status is never given in expedited
removal proceedings. If someone is eligible for asylum or has proven facts or
law that make them ineligible for expedited proceedings, the person simply is
no longer subjected to expedited removal. The DHS retains jurisdiction over
them to adjudicate any alleged immigration violations or confer lawful status
163. See Christina Wilkes, Government-Funded Counsel for Children in Immigration Court?,
MD. STATE BAR ASS’N BULLETIN (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.msba.org/Bar_Bulletin/2016/08__August/Government-Funded_Counsel_for_Children_in_Immigration_Court_.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4ZKT-SF2V] (commenting on class action request for attorneys to represent
children, Judge Milan Smith noted, “[a]mong the most complicated of all the laws I deal with is the
immigration statute” ).
164. Einhorn, supra note 125.
165. Id.
166. Dana Leigh Marks, Immigration Judge: Death Penalty Cases in a Traffic Court Setting,
CNN (June 26, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/26/opinion/immigration-judge-broken-system/
[https://perma.cc/XH86-A9B8].
167. Id.
168. Kaufman, supra note 119, at 131.
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to them.169 Those proceedings are contested by Government attorneys. There
has been no compelling reason why they must also be present at the preliminary
adjudication that occurs in expedited removal proceedings.
As for any delay, there is no data that supports the proposition that a right
to counsel causes delays. To the contrary, the available empirical data indicates
that attorney participation in the expedited removal proceedings has no
meaningful impact on the pace of adjudication.170 As previously stated, at the
Dilley detention center, where counsel is available to any person detained there,
the expedited removal proceedings take about two to four weeks.171
In Peralta-Sanchez, the Government resisted the involvement of attorneys
on the basis that the Government would incur costs of subjecting more people
to detention.172 Putting aside the logical concerns in the asserted causation,
nothing compels the Government to detain non-citizens, especially because
those who are being apprehended for civil violations, are not violent, and are
seeking asylum. The Federal Government has previously acknowledged in
court filings in the Flores detention litigation that it has a variety of release
mechanisms at its disposal such as “bond, release on own recognizance, orders
of supervision, or parole” when addressing expedited removal proceedings for
family units.173
Indeed, alternatives to immigration detention exist, which are effective and
less costly. The existing Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP)
uses “electronic ankle monitors, biometric voice recognition software,
unannounced home visits, employer verification, and in-person reporting to
supervise participants.”174 Community support programs—not funded by ICE
but operated by religious organizations in cooperation with ICE—are also
effective in assisting with court appearance rates and compliance with final
removal orders.175
169. Marks, supra note 166. See generally Victoria-Faustino v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 869, 876 (7th
Cir. 2017) (holding that the DHS improperly issued a final order of administrative removal and
remanding the case to the DHS for further proceedings).
170. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 152, at 65 tbl.6.
171. See Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907, 910 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
172. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2017), withdrawn on grant
of reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), memorandum disposition in No. 14-50393, 2017 WL 3601725
(9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).
173. See Declaration of Thomas Homan at 11, Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907 (C.D. Cal.
2015).
174. Alternatives to Immigration Detention: Less Costly and More Humane Than Federal LockUp,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-fact-sheet-alternatives-immigration-detention-atd
[https://perma.cc/KL5R-FUWR] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
175. Id.
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As a constitutional matter, the most reasonable inference is that the
involvement of counsel in the rapid removal proceedings that would be afforded
under the right to access to counsel is very much due.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the past twenty years, rapid removals have forced over 4.2 million people
to leave the United States.176 This mass expulsion occurred under procedures
that permitted a single immigration officer to deport a person, without an
impartial fact-finder, without a right to appeal, and often without any review of
the decision. As much as the authors wish Congress would simply repeal these
procedures, President Obama perfected their use and President Trump is
maximizing their reach. They are responsible for more than 76% of all
deportations, which is a number that will only increase in the near-future. 177
Given that reality, their use must comport with constitutional protections:
in particular, the right to access to counsel. Although legal challenges
addressing this question have been rare, the dire landscape is the result of the
procedures’ chilling effectiveness in achieving efficiency, not in any normative
measures of success that include fairness, reasonableness, and accuracy. This
Article set forth the reasons why the minimal process that is due to non-citizens
in rapid removals includes access to counsel. The private interest is to those
with legitimate claims to secure status—which is currently wrongfully
measured in how much time someone has been in the country when the proper
focus is on how significant legal status will impact those fleeing persecution or
those with strong familial ties. The current procedures permit mistakes without
a means to correct them. When only attorneys are added, studies show that
removals are reversed at rates of 97% and 99%.178 The additional burdens to
the Government to permit attorneys to participate in rapid removal procedures
are minimal. They do not add time or expense to the process, they merely
ensure that those who never belonged in these expedited proceedings are not
subjected to them.
There needs to be a larger debate over our immigration policy. But in the
meantime, the Constitution compels a right to access to counsel to all subjected
to these rapid removals as long as they continue to be used.

176. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

